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FURTHER THOUGHTS ON KANTER AND BALLARD
By Steve R. Johnson
Steve R. Johnson is the E.L. Wiegand Professor at
the William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
·,Nevada, Las Vegas. This article arose out of the
·. author's participation in a program on the Kanter and
Ballard cases on October 1, 2004, given by the Court
.· Procedure and Practice Committee of the American
Bar Association Section of Taxation. For stimulating
perspectives (sometimes agreeing, sometimes dis: agreeing with his views), the author thanks the program audience and his co-panelists: Joshua Odintz,
Michael Saltzman, Leandra Lederman, and Allen
Madison. Some of the research in this article was
Madison's. Of course, any errors in this article are the
author's, not Madi~on's or anyone else's. The author
also thanks his colleagues at the Boyd School of Law
·for their suggestions and comments.
The Supreme Court is about to hear arguments in
.these consolidated cases. They involve constitutional
and statutory challenges to the Tax Court's application
of its Rule 183 in a controversial unreported income
and fraud case. The author argues that the decisions of
·the Tax Court and of three circuit courts rejecting those
challenges are correct under the law and are well
··founded in important policies as to the operation of
the courts.
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On December 7, 2004, the Supreme Court will hear
oral arguments in the consolidated Kanter and Ballard
cases.1 The Tax Court had substantially upheld the IRS's
determinations of large deficiencies and fraud penalties
against several taxpayers. 2 The taxpayers argued in part
that the Tax Court's application of its Rule 183 violated
both due process and applicable statutes. I disagreed
with those arguments then,3 and I continue to do so now.
On appeal, the taxpayers' challenges to Rule 183 were
rejected by the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. 4 The
decisions of those circuits are sound and should be
affirmed.
Both an affirmative case and a negative case can be
made in favor of the decisions. The affirmative case
consists of the values that the current regime reflects,
values that would be compromised by accepting the
taxpayers' arguments. The negative case responds to the
constitutional and statutory content; )ns raised by the
taxpayers and others .
This article has five parts. Part I recounts the procedural context and pertinent facts of the cases. Parts II and
III develop the affirmative case. Affirming the decisions
would support the process values that courts speak
through their opinions and it is inappropriate to go
behind opinions to examine judges' thought processes or
motivations (Part II), and that courts should be able to
craft rules that reflect their needs and safeguard their
internal deliberative processes (Part III).
Parts N and V present the negative case. They do not
address every point raised by the taxpayers and others
but instead focus on particularly instructive parts of the
arguments. Part N considers the due process arguments.
It maintains in part that the taxpayers inappropriately

1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in these cases at 124
S. Ct. 2065 and 2066 (2004) .
2
Investment Research Associates Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1999-407, 78 T.C.M. 95, Doc 1999-39247, 1999 TNT 241-4,
241-5 (1999).
3
Quoted by David Lupi-Sher and Sheryl Stratton, "Tax Bar
Divided on Taxpayers' Attempt to Obtain STJ's Report," Tax
Notes, Feb. 12, 2001, p. 865 at 868-869.
4
Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 341 F.3d 364, Doc 2003-17787,
2003TNT148-12 (5th Cir. 2003); Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner,
337 F.3d 833, Doc 2003-17426, 2003 TNT 144-23 (7th Cir.
2003)(per curiam), rehearing and rehearing en bane denied; Ballard
v. Commissioner, 321 F.3d 1037, Doc 2003-4416, 2003 TNT 34-19
(11th Cir. 2003), rehearing and rehearing en bane denied 67 Fed.
Appx. 590 (2003).
·
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conflate evaluation of witness credibility and the smaller,
included notion of evaluation of witness demeanor, and
that the taxpayers seek to impose procedural inflexibility
that the due process component of the Fifth Amendment
has never required and does not require today Part V
considers the statutory arguments and the policy of
judicial transparency. It argues that Rule 183 is consistent
with existing statutes, and that, if the rule is to be
changed, the agent of change should be Congress, not the
Supreme Court.

I. Background
A. Special Trial Judges
The 19 judges of the Tax Court are appointed by the
president with the advice and consent of the Senate, for
15-year terms. 5 In contrast, special trial judges (S1Js) are
appointed by the chief judge of the Tax Court and have
no statutorily mandated tenure. 6 The chief judge may
assign several types of cases to S1Js: declaratory judgment proceedings, cases involving amounts under
$50,000, collectio11 due process cases, and "any other
proceeding which the chief judge may designate." 7
"[S]ubject to such conditions and review as the [Tax
Court] may provide," the STJ is authorized to render the
decision for the court in all but the last of the above types
of cases. 8 In the last type, the case may be assigned to the
S1J for hearing but it must be assigned to a "regular"
judge (the judge) for decision. 9 Kanter, Ballard, and related cases are of that type.
The roles of the S1J and the judge in cases like ours are
set out in Tax Court Rule 183. That rule has undergone
evolution. The current version of Rule 183 has been in
place since 1984. 10 In pertinent part, it provides that an
S1J "shall conduct the trial" 11 and, after the parties have
filed their briefs, "shall submit a report, including findings of fact and opinion, to the Chief Judge, and the Chief
Judge will assign the case to a judge [for decision]." 12 The
judge
may adopt the [S1J's] report or may modify it or
may reject it in whole or in part, or may direct the
filing of additional briefs or may receive further
evidence or may direct oral argument, or may
recommit the report with instructions. Due regard
shall be given to the circumstance that the [S1J] had
the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and the findings of fact recommended by
the [S1J] shall be presumed to be correct. 13

5Section 7443.
6Section 7443A.
7Section 7443A(b).
8
Section 7443(c).
9
The Supreme Court confirmed this reading of the relevant
statutes in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 873-77 (1991).
10
See Amendments to Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
United States Tax Court, 81 T.C. 1043, 1069 (1983).
11
Tax Ct. R. 183(a).
12
Id. R. l83(b).
13Id. R. 183(c).
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Before 1984 the rule (then numbered as Rule 182)
provided that the S1J would "file" the report (as oppos d
to "submit" it as under current Rule 183).14 Under t~
for~er rule, the S1J' s origU:al repor~ was served on th:
parties and they were pernntted to file exceptions to it 15
The Tax Court did not explain its reasons for chang~
the rule. However, the court's comment regarding thg
new rule did state: "The prior provisions for service 0~
the [S1J's] report on each party and for the filing of
exceptions to that report have been deleted."16

B. Kanter and Ballard
Burton Kanter was a prominent tax attorney. Claude
Ballard and Robert Lisle were vice presidents of Prudential Life Insurance Co. The IRS alleged that Kanter
Ballard, and Lisle participated in a scheme in whicl~
persons who sought to do business with Prudential paid
kickbacks to Kanter, which were divided among Ballard
Lisle, and Kanter. The IRS further alleged that the thre~
funnelled the kickbacks through a complex web of trusts,
partnerships, and corporations. The IRS issued notices of
deficiency determining, in addition to about 40 other
adjustments, that millions of dollars of kickbacks and
other income had been improperly omitted from the
taxpayers' income tax returns. Later, the IRS asserted civil
fraud penalties.
The taxpayers filed Tax Court petitions. The chief
judge of the Tax Court assigned the cases for hearing to
Special Trial Judge Irvin Couvillion. A lengthy and con·
tentious trial ensued. The trial lasted almost five weeks
and produced a transcript exceeding 5,400 pages. The
parties' briefs totaled nearly 4,700 pages, and the court
"plodded through thousands of exhibits containing hundreds of thousands of pages." 17
After the trial, the S1J submitted a report on the
consolidated cases to the chief judge as required by Tax
Court Rule 183(b ). The chief judge assigned the cases,
again under Rule 183(b), to Judge Howard Dawson for
decision. On December 15, 1999, the Tax Court issued its
decision. The decision stated: "The Court agrees with the
opinion of the Special Trial Judge, which is set forth
below." 18 The Tax Court substantially upheld the IRS's
determinations. It held that "[a]s a result of the overall
scheme, over $13 million of kickback and other income
was omitted by [the taxpayers] collectively." 19 The court
also upheld fraud penalties on Lisle, Ballard, and Kanter.

14Former Tax Ct. R. 182(b), 60 T.C. 1149 (1973). Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 10 requires that the record on app.eal
include "the original papers and exhibits filed in the [trial]
court." The Seventh Circuit held that, under the current rnle, an
STJ's original report is a "preliminary finding[] or report[]" and
need not be included in the record on appeal. Kanter, supra note
4, 337 F.3d at 842.
1
15Former Rule 182, and so portions surviving in current Ru e
183, was "intended ... to provide procedures more comparabJ~
to those which obtain in the Court of Claims." 60 T.C. 1057, 11.
(1976). For discussion of former Rule 182, see Stone v. Commtssioner, 865 F.2d 342, 344-48 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
1681 T.C. at 1070.
171999 TNT 241-4 para. 407.
18
Id. para. 1.
19
Id. para. 646.
'
c
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There followed rounds of posttrial motions. They
focused on the taxpayers' suspicion that the court's
opinion came to conclusions more adverse to them than
those originally reached by the STJ. Specifically,20
" In April 2000 the taxpayers moved for access to "all
reports, draft opinions or similar documents, prepared and delivered to the Court pursuant to Rule
183(b )" or, in the alternative, that the Tax Court
either certify the issue for interlocutory appeal or
make the STJ' s original findings part of the record
for appeal. On April 26, 2000, Judge Dawson denied
the motion. His order stated that, in his decision for
the court, he had given "due regard to the fact that
[the STJ] evaluated the credibility of the witnesses ...
and treated the findings of fact recommended by the
(STJ] as being presumptively correct."21
• In May 2001 the taxpayers filed a motion asking that
the STJ's original report be placed under seal and
made part of the record for appeal. That motion was
denied on May 30, 2000.
" In August 2000 the taxpayers filed a motion asking
the Tax Court to reconsider its denials of the previous motions or, in the alternative, to grant a new
trial. In support of the motion, the taxpayers submitted an affidavit from one of their lawyers. The
affidavit stated that the lawyer had been approached by at least two Tax Court judges (not
identified in the affidavit), 22 who said that "substantial sections of the opinion were not written by [the
STJ], and that those sections containing findings
related to the credibility of witnesses and findings
related to fraud were wholly contrary to the findings made by [the STJ] in his report." 23 The affidavit
also alleged that the court's findings regarding
fraud were made by the judge and that what the
lawyer had been told by the two judges was confirmed by what he was told by yet a third unidentified judge.24
On August 30, 2000, the Tax Court issued an order
denying that motion. The order stated that "contrary to
the contents of the affidavit, the underlying report
adopted by the Tax Court is, in fact, [the STJ's] report."
The order was signed by the judge, the STJ, and the chief
judge.
" Subsequently, the taxpayers petitioned an appellate
court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Tax
Court to provide taxpayers with a copy of the
original STJ's report or, in the alternative, to require
the Tax Court to provide any changes made by the
judge to the STJ's original report. The petition was
denied.
There followed the three unsuccessful appeals. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed regarding the Rule 183 issues by a

20 The following history is drawn from Ballard, supra note 4,
321 F.3d at 1040-41.
21 Doc 2001-2950, 2001 TNT 23-31.
22Their identities were disclosed during oral argument before the Seventh Circuit. See Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 875.
23
Ballard, supra note 4, 321 F.3d at 1041.
24Id.
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vote of 3-0; the Eleventh Circuit by a 3-0 vote; and the
Seventh Circuit by a vote of 2-1. The one was Judge
Cudahy, who concurred in part and dissented in part. He
agreed with the majority that Rule 183 does not require
disclosure of an STJ' s original report; Rule 183 does not
require the Tax Court to review an STJ' s initial findings
under a "clearly erroneous" standard; Rule 183 is not
violated "by a quasi-collaborative process of revision of
an STJ's report"; and no statute requires disclosure of an
STJ's original report.2s
Judge Cudahy also agreed with some of the majority's
conclusions regarding due process. He said:
along the full continuum of due process concerns
framed by [Supreme Court precedents], there is no
per se due process violation when the ultimate
finder of fact reviews preliminary findings de nova.
Therefore, I agree with the majority that the Fifth
Amendment does not require that the Tax Court
review STJ findings using any particular degree of
deference. This means also that there is no constitutional requirement that the Tax Court use an
appellate-style review of its STJs' reports. In this
respect, the quasi-collaborative model adopted by
the Tax Court is permissible. 26
In the above respects, Judge Cudahy rejected the
taxpayers' interpretation of cases that also feature prominently in their briefs and in amid briefs submitted to the
Supreme Court, cases such as Raddatz, 27 Universal Camera,28 and Mathews v. Eldridge. 29 However, Judge Cudahy
concluded that appellate review of the Tax Court's findings could not be effective without access to the STJ's
initial report. Judge Cudahy dissented on the ground that
ineffective review violates due process. 30
C. Reactions

Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle have sparked great interest.
Many articles have been written on the cases. 31 Although
commentators are divided, most of them criticize the

25

Id., at 877-81 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in ~art).
6

Id., at 882.
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
28
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
27

29

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Ballard, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 884-888.
31 E.g., Randall G. Dick, "Further Thoughts on Tax Court
Special Trial Judge Reports," Tax Notes, Feb. 26, 2001, p. 1253;
Randall G. Dick, "When the Special Trial Judge Who Hears Your
Case Does Not Decide It, What Are Your Options - If Any?" 4
J. Tax Prac. and Proc. 19 (Dec. 2002/Jan. 2003); Cornish F.
Hitchcock, "Public Access to Special Trial Judge Reports," Tax
Notes, Oct. 15, 2001, p. 403; Gerald Kafka and Jonathan Ackerman, "Fact-Finding in the Tax Court: Access to Special Trial
Judge Reports," Tax Notes, Apr. 23, 2001, p. 639; Eric Winwood,
"The Reclusive Report: The Tax Court Denies Due Process by
Not Disclosing Special Trial Judge Reports to Litigants," 2004
Fed. Cts L. Rev. 3. Mr. Dick is the attorney who submitted the
affidavit describing alleged conversations with initially unidentified Tax Court judges.
30
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decisions. Many amicus briefs have been filed with the
Supreme Court,32 again criticizing the decisions.
All of the critics - whether the taxpayers, commentators, or amici - support giving greater prominence to
the original STJ's report (assuming there was one that
differed from the report adopted as the Tax Court's
decision). There are different forms that such greater
prominence could take. The continuum, ranging from
weakest to strongest form, includes at least these possibilities: adding the original STJ's report to the record
furnished the appellate courts, furnishing the original
report to the parties during the Tax Court proceeding,
furnishing the original report to the parties and permitting them to file objections to it,33 and according a greater
degree of formal deference to the STJ' s findings and
recommendations, perhaps as high as "clearly erroneous" deference.34

II. Policy of Not Going Behind Judicial Opinions
If the Tax Court's decision in our cases were consistent
with the views of the STJ, all or nearly all of the
complaints against the decision evanesce. If the Tax
Court's words are taken at face value, the decision is
consistent with the STJ' s views. As noted in Part I, the Tax
Court's December 15, 1999, decision stated, "The Court
agrees with the opinion 'of the [STJ], which is set forth
below," and the court's August 30, 2000, order - which
was signed by the STJ, the judge, and the chief judge stated, "The underlying report adopted by the Tax Court
is, in fact, [the STJ's] report."
The taxpayers' position, therefore, requires going behind or beyond the court's words. Doing so, however,
would be distinctly undesirable. There is a strong tradition in our legal culture that courts speak through their
issued opinions. Numerous times courts have held that
the mental processes of judges and administrators cannot
be inquired into or be made subject to discovery. The
Supreme Court stated in the often cited decision of
Fayerweather v. Rich: "A judgment is a solemn record.
Parties have a right to rely upon it. It should not lightly
be disturbed, and ought never to be overthrown or
limited by the oral testimony of a judge ... of what he
had in mind at the time of the decision." 35
The principle of not looking behind juridical acts is
familiar from other contexts as well. For instance, "courts
will not review the motives of a legislature in enacting a
law"; 36 the thoughts of jurors and the processes by which

32
Amicus briefs have been filed, jointly or separately, by
Public Citizen, the ACLU, the National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation, Prof. Leandra Lederman,
former Sen. David Pryor, and the Lisles.
33In effect, this would restore the pre-1984 version of current
Rule 183.
34For example, the Kanter taxpayers argued to the Seventh
Circuit "that the STJ's report cannot be rejected by the Tax Court
unless [it is] clearly erroneous." Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at
840.
35 195 U.S. 276, 307 (1904); see also In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 265
(7th Cir. 1995).
36
United States v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1978)
(citing cases).
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;~ey r~ach their v.erdicts typi~a~y ar~ beyo:r:d scrutiny; 37

[t]he inner workings of administrative decision makin
processes are almost never subject to discovery";3s and g
statutory notice of deficiency represents the official d ~
termination of the IRS, and courts should not go behin~
the notice to examine the IRS's thought processes.39
Of course, those rules are not infrangible. Exceptions
exist in matters of overwhelming public importance
such as invidious prejudice by the decisiorunaker(s)
against a protected class of persons. But the reluctance of
the courts to create those exceptions underscores the
importance of the general principle. Moreover, the rule
against looking behind judicial decisions is even stronger
than the rules against looking behind other juridical
acts. 40 As one court stated: "The trial judge's statement of
his mental process is so impervious to attack that even if
he were to come forward today and declare that his
memorandum misstated his reasons for [his decision], we
could not consider his explanations."41
That being so, the Supreme Court should accord no
weight whatsoever to the affidavit, described in Part J.B.,
from one of the taxpayers' attorneys describing his
alleged conversations with several Tax Court judges. On
the strength of the principle just quoted, not even a
postdecision statement from the STJ or the judge would
be admissible to undercut the Tax Court's decision.
Surely, then, alleged statements by other judges should
not be.
As courts have said in other contexts, 42 the gain in
occasional discovery of error that would result from
going behind decisions would be outweighed by the
harms, such as uncertainty, prolonged contention, and
harassment of decisionmakers to explain, modify, or
repudiate their decisions.
Reflect for a moment on how an affidavit such as the
one here could come about and what could happen in
future cases were such affidavits admissible. Tax Court
judges are selected from the ranks of private-sector and
government tax attorneys, and they often maintain
friendships with their former peers. A current judge
might try to console a friend who had just lost a Tax
Court case. The words of consolation might be infelicitously phrased or be misperceived by their hearer. More
perniciously, a judge might use rumor and innuendo to
attack another judge's decisions to make life difficult for
a rival or disliked colleague on the bench.

37

E.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-121 (1987).
Goetz v. Crosson, 41 F.3d 800, 805 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied
516 U.S. 821 (1995); see also United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,
38

422 (1941).
39

E.g., Greenberg's Express Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 324,

327-328 (1974).
40
E.g., Goetz, supra note 38, 41 F.3d at 805 ("Clearly, the inner
workings of decision making by courts are kept in even greater
confidence [than are decisional processes of administrative
agencies].").
41
Crouch, supra note 36, 566 F.2d at 1316.
42
E.g., Tanner, supra note 37, 483 U.S. at 120; McDonald & U.S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-268 (1915)(both
cases making this point in the context of jury verdicts).
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•'e1 ;• I have no reason to believe that mis:placed s~pathy,

•:?·· alice or any other unworthy motive explams the

;; :f{ida~t here, and I cast no ~sper.sions o~ either the
, 1 wyer who authored the affidavit or his supposed
..• ~urces. My point only is that those things could happen
~future cases were we to repudiate the sound principle
gainst looking behind judicial decisions. That can of
a
should remain sealed. The potential for mischief,
for disruption of orderly judicial process, is too great.
. fu summary, complaints about this decision fail if the
Tax Court's decision is consonant with the STJ's view of
.the case. The Tax Court (including the STJ) has affirmed
and reaffirmed that the decision is consonant with the
sTJ's views. There the matter should end. The Supreme
Court should use this case to reaffirm the sound principle
that what appellate courts review are the decisions of
trial courts, not the mental processes behind those decisions.

III. Deliberative Process
Compared with some other trial courts, the Tax Court
iS marked by a considerable degree of internal review,
consultation, and deliberation. For example, the chief
judge reviews judges' reports, and reports may be circulated and discussed as part of a full-court consideration. 43
Under Rule 183, there also may be consultation and
discussion between the STJ assigned to hear a case and
the judge assigned to decide it. That will not happen
while the STJ is preparing his original report because,
1,l11der Rule 183(b), that report is submitted to the chief
·judge before the chief judge assigns the case to a judge for
decision. Discussion may occur, however, after the case
has been assigned to the judge as he considers, under
Rule 183(c), whether to adopt, modify, or reject in whole
or in part the STJ's proposed findings and opinion.
Judge Cudahy recognized that possibility and was
-- troubled by it. He feared that, because of unequal status,
the judge could overbear the STJ's convictions, causing
the STJ to "revise" his opinion to conform to the judge's
views. 44 The judge would then "adopt" what was in
name, though not in truth, the new STJ's report. Judge
Cudahy wrote:

Jr

What Kanter alleges happened in the present case,
and what commonly occurs in the Tax Court, is that
a Tax Court judge takes the STJ's report ... and
works together with the STJ to edit it. From this
process emerges a final report that may or may not
bear any resemblance to the original report, but that
still may be called the STJ' s "opinion" (but not the
STJ's "report") if the STJ agrees to subscribe to it.
This modified report is then "adopted" by the Tax
Court judge and filed as the Tax Court "opinion."

4,

***

5.

See section 7460(b).
But cf Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 678-681 (2d Cir. 1989),
c~rt: denied 493 U.S. 812 (1989)(rejecting arguments by administrative law judges (ALJ) that review procedures established by
the secretary of Health and Human Services compromised the
decisional independence of the ALJs _in Social Security cases).

43

44

h
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I believe that the record supports the notion that the
Tax Court engages in a quasi-collaborative process
of review of the STJ's report from which a new and
frequently different STJ's opinion emerges to be
adopted and agreed with by the Tax Court. 45
I do not know if that description is correct at the level
of fact. Assume arguendo that it is. I do not find the
possibility of collaboration between the judge and the STJ
either distressing or sinister. I think it's good. From a
collaborative, consultative process, better decisions presumably will emerge. If the judge asks the STJ, "About
this part of your opinion, did you consider X? And what
about Y and Z?," the resultant intellectual thrusts and
parries are more likely to help than to hurt the quality of
decisionmaking. 46
Both the Eleventh Circuit and the Seventh Circuit
underlined the importance of the deliberative process
value. 47 The Eleventh Circuit said:
While the procedures used in the Tax Court may be
unique to that court, there is nothing unusual about
judges conferring with one another about cases
assigned to them. . . . And, as a result of such
conferences, judges sometimes change their original position or thoughts. Whether [the STJ] prepared drafts of his report or subsequently changed
his mind entirely is without import insofar as our
analysis of the alleged due process violation ... is
concerned. Despite the invitation, this court will
simply not interfere with another court's deliberative process. 48
The Seventh Circuit agreed, saying:
If ... Rule 183 in fact provides the opportunity for
STJs and Tax Court judges to conference regarding
the STJ's preliminary findings, then we have every
reason to believe that Tax Court judges would duly
regard the input of the STJ and that he, in turn,
would participate meaningfully in the exchange.
Like [other circuits], we too are loath to interfere
with another court's deliberative process. 49

IV. Due Process
A. Generally

An important part of the complaints against Rule 183
is that the relationship it establishes between the hearing
magistrate (the STJ) and the deciding magistrate (the

45
Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.2d at 876 (Cudahy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
46 For further discussion of the deliberative process value as
it bears on Kanter/ Ballard, see Allen D. Madison, "Revisiting
Access to the Tax Court's Deliberative Process," Tax Notes, May
10, 2004, p. 749; Allen D. Madison, "Access to the Tax Court's
Deliberative Processes," Tax Notes, June 25, 2001, p. 2247.
47
By incorporation, the Fifth Circuit may have done so as
well. See Lisle, supra note 4, 341 F.3d at 384 (saying, in its due
process analysis: "We find the reasoning of the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits direct and persuasive, and adopt it here.").
48
Ballard, supra note 4, 321 F.3d at 1042-1043.
49
Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 844.
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judge) is rmusual, indeed rmique, in federal practice.so In
other contexts - such as a magistrate judge relative to a
district court judge or an administrative law judge relative to an agency secretary or commissioner - the report
of the hearing officer is, pursuant to statute or rule, given
"clearly erroneous" review by the deciding officer or, at
least, is included in the record received by the appellate
court reviewing the trial tribrmal's decision.s 1
Accept arguendo that the relationship created by current Rule 183(b) is rmique in federal practice.s2 I do not
think that matters. The courts have repeatedly held that
due process' is a flexible concept, one that depends on
context and does not command that all tribrmals' processes be identica1.s3 Quite rightly, courts are reluctant to
invalidate the rules of other courts. Due process is not so
rigid that the procedures of different tribrmals must be
wrenched or whittled onto a Procrustean bed.
The taxpayers argue to the contrary (at least in part),
relying on a line of cases represented most recently by the
Supreme Court's Oberg decision.s4 They maintain, rmder
Oberg, that "material departure from well-established
and traditional judicial procedures creates a presumptive
due process violation."ss To be sure, there are words in
Oberg that can be used to support the taxpayers' contention. But words in a judicial opinion cannot be divorced
from context.s6 Understood contextually, Oberg does not
carry the taxpayers very far.
In Oberg the Supreme Court held that due process was
violated by a state rule (added to the state constitution by
direct vote of the people)s7 that severely limited judicial

i
I

Ii!

"

f

\"'

sosee, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen Inc., and the
American Civil Liberties Union, Kanter v. Commissioner, No.
03-1034, at 5-13.
51
See, e.g., Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 874-875.
52At some stages of this litigation, the government has
argued that memoranda prepared by a judge's law clerk are
internal deliberative documents privileged against disclosure.
Part of the debate in Kanter/Ballard involves whether an STJ's
original report is better likened to a law clerk's memorandum or
to a recommended decision penned by a district court magistrate judge or by an ALJ.
53
E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("due
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands"); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)("Due Process, unlike some legal rules, is
not a technical conception with a fixed context unrelated to
time, place and circumstances.").
s4Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
ssraxpayers' Brief on the Merits on Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Ballard v. Commissioner, No. 03-184, at 44.
56"Particularly in dealing with claims under broad provisions of the Constitution, which derive context by an interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that
generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context
in disregard of variant controlling facts." Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339, 343-344 (1960); see also Northern Nat'l Bank v. Porter
Township, 110 U.S. 608, 615 (1884)(noting, quoting prior cases,
that it is "a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the
case in which those expressions are used").
s7Courts have struggled with the proper role of judicial
review of constitutional referenda and initiatives. See, e.g., Steve

review of prmitive damage awards by juries. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Constitution imposes
substantive limits on the size of prmitive damages
awards; that judicial review was an important safeguard
under the common law against excessive awards; and
that the state's deprivation of that well-established
common-law protection violated due process because the
state's remaining procedures afforded insufficient protection against excessive awards.
In context, Oberg is readily distinguishable from
Kanter/Ballard. First, Oberg's core issue - the concern
about rrmaway juries imposing astronomical prmitive
damages - was significant. Many courts and commentators have given voice to this concem,ss and Oberg
clearly was animated by it. The Court said:
Prmitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary
deprivation of property. Jury instructions typically
leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing
amormts, and the preservation of evidence of a
defendant's net worth creates the potential that
juries will use their verdicts to express biases
against big businesses, particularly those without
strong local presences. Judicial review of the
amount awarded was one of the few procedural
safeguards against that danger.s9
Second, Oberg reaffirmed that flexibility, not rigidity,
characterizes due process analysis. The Court stated: "Of
course, not all deviations from established procedures
result in constitutional infirmity. As the Court noted in
Hurtado, to hold all procedural change rmconstitutional
'would be to deny every quality of the law but its age,
and to render it incapable of progress or improvement."'60 The Court distinguished Hurtado by noting
that, in that case, "examination by a neutral magistrate
provided criminal defendants with nearly the same protection as the abrogated common-law grand jury procedure."61
In cases such as Kanter and Ballard, a neutral magistrate, the judge, is empowered and directed by statute
and rule to render decision on behalf of the Tax Court,
subject to the court's established procedures. Oberg invoked legal tradition to require judicial review of jury
awards of punitive damages when other controls were
nonexistent or weak. It is a stretch to say that Oberg
establishes a presumption against the constitutionality of
a court's internal review procedures when they differ
from other forums' internal review procedures. The
stretch is greater than elasticity will bear given that Oberg
reaffirmed the constitutional permissibility of procedural
variations.

R. Johnson, "Supermajority Provisions, Guinn v. Legislature and
a Flawed Constitutional Structure," 4 Nev. L.J. 491, 502-506 and

nn. 81, 96 (2004)(citing authorities).
s8For example, in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1 (1991), a majority of the justices agreed that the Due Process
Clause imposes limits on punitive damages awards.
59
0berg, supra note 54, 512 U.S. at 432.
60
Id. at 430-31 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529
(1884)).
61512 U.S. at 431.
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1240

TAX NOTES, November 29, 2004

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

B. Eldridge Factors
The taxpayers 62 invoke the three-factor analysis offered in Mathews v. Eldridge 63 and repeated in United
States v. Raddatz. 64 Those factors are: the private interest at
stake, the risk of an erroneous determination under the
procedures in question, and "the public interest and
administrative burdens, including costs that the additional procedures would involve."65 Far from calling it
into question, those cases confirm the constitutionality of
Rule 183.
Again, context matters. In Eldridge a recipient whose
Social Security disability benefits had been terminated
challenged the termination on due process grounds. The
district court and the circuit court agreed with the
recipient. The Supreme Court reversed, upholding the
constitutionality of Social Security Administration procedures. The Court held that due process does not require
an evidentiary hearing before termination of Social Security benefits.
In so doing, the Court distinguished its earlier decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 66 which had found a due process
right to an evidentiary hearing before termination of
welfare benefits. Eldridge is widely and rightly understood as a retrenchment.67 By limiting Goldberg, it put the
brakes on an incipient due process revolution that some
had thought would sweep through administrative procedure. In that light, the taxpayers' reliance on Eldridge is
antihistorical and anticontextual. Eldridge was a shield
meant to protect agency processes from rigid constitutionalization. The taxpayers would convert that case into
a sword with which to attack court processes tailored to
the particular tribunal's nature and needs.
Even if we view the Eldridge formulation abstractly,
divorced from its history and context, it still would not
suggest due process infirmity in Rule 183. We consider
the three Eldridge factors below.
1. Private interest at stake. Consider this factor in relation to Raddatz, a 1980 case that invoked the tripartite
- Eldridge formulation. The defendant had been convicted
of violating a federal statute prohibiting receipt of a
firearm through interstate commerce by a convicted
felon. On appeal, the defendant alleged due process
violation. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress
incriminating statements he had made to police officers.
The district court referred the motion to a magistrate
judge for an evidentiary hearing, after which the court
ruled on the motion based on the record developed at the
hearing and the magistrate's proposed findings of fact
and recommendation.6B

62

See Taxpayers' Brief on the Merits on Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Ballard v. Commissioner, No. 03-184, at 47-48.
63
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
64447 U.S. 667 (1980).
65
424 U.S. at 335.
66
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
67
See, e.g., William F. Fox Jr., Understanding Administrative Law
151-154 (3d. ed. 1997).
68
These procedures were set out in the Federal Magistrates
Act, 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(l). The act allows the district court
to make de nova determination as to those portions of the
magistrate's report to which a party objects, and it allows the

The district court accepted the magistrate judge's
proposed findings of fact and recommendations, and it
denied the suppression motion. The circuit court reversed, holding that the defendant was denied due
process because the district court judge failed personally
to hear the controverted testimony on the motion to
suppress. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court.
The Court held that the district court was not constitutionally required to rehear the testimony to make an
independent evaluation of witness demeanor or credibility. 69
In addressing the first Eldridge factor (the private
interest at stake), the Supreme Court noted that, as a
practical matter, resolution of a suppression motion often
determines whether the defendant will be convicted or
acquitted. Nonetheless, the Court held, the interests at
stake in a suppression hearing are lower than in the
criminal trial itself.70

The interests at stake in a Tax Court trial - always
civil - are lower than those at stake in criminal trials.
They also are lower than those at stake in cases like
Goldberg and Eldridge. Receipt of welfare or (perhaps)
Social Security payments may be critical to one's economic security, even survival. Although millions of dollars of tax liability were at stake in Kanter, Ballard, and
related cases, those liabilities are unlikely to rise to the
level of imperiling the taxpayers' economic survival,
especially given the existence of options such as offers in
compromise and bankruptcy. Undeniably, the private
interests in our cases are important, but they do not rise
to the levels of Goldberg (where a due process challenge
succeeded) or of Raddatz and Eldridge (where due process
challenges failed).
As a postscript, consider another use taxpayers would
make of Raddatz. The Court remarked in passing: "The
issue is not before us, but we assume it is unlikely that a
district judge would reject a magistrate's proposed findings on credibility when those findings are dispositive
and substitute the judge's own appraisal; to do so without seeing and hearing the witness ... whose credibility
is in question could well give rise to serious questions
which we do not reach." 71
That statement does. not control our cases. It was
dictum, as the Court's own words reveal, and questions
that are "serious" in a criminal context may be less so in
a civil context. Moreover, the predicate condition, that
observing the witness generated findings that are "dispositive," is absent in our cases. That is because of the
distinction between demeanor and credibility. That distinction is developed in the discussion immediately below.

district court to accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
magistrate judge's findings and recommendations. The act also
allows the district court to receive further evidence or to
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Id.
69
447 U.S. at 677-680.
70
Id., at 677-681.
71
Id., at 681 n.7 (emphasis in original).
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2. Risk of error. The taxpayers stress that the STJ was the
magistrate who heard and saw the witnesses as they
testified at trial. Important to their position is a contention along the following lines: "These are fraud cases. The
ultimate issue as to fraud involves the taxpayers' state of
mind or intention. 72 Thus, it is particularly important to
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, especially the
taxpayers. When a taxpayer is on the stand testifying as
to what he knew or intended, the court must evaluate the
taxpayer's credibility. The magistrate who presided over
the trial, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses as they testified, is uniquely able to make those
vital credibility determinations."73
There is something to that contention, but much less
than critics of the Tax Court's and circuit courts' decisions
might wish. That contention conflates demeanor and
credibility. Demeanor is the witness's behavior on the
stand. Did she make eye contact? Did she squirm or
perspire profusely? How long did she pause before
answering? What was her tone? The hearing officer is in
a better position to assess those things. But demeanor is
only one of the many factors that feed into the credibility
determination, and often it is not the most important of
those factors.
The Supreme Court'~ decision in Anderson v. Bessemer
City74 is significant in that regard. The Court reaffirmed
that a trial court's findings of fact are not to be overturned on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. The
Court gave "opportunity to observe the witnesses" as
one rationale, but it did not rest the rule simply on that
basis. The Court said that deference is required /1 even
when the ... court's findings do not rest on credibility
determinations, but are based instead on physical or
documentary evidence or inferences from other facts." 75
The Court expressly rejected lower court decisions that
no deference is due when the trial court's findings are not
based on credibility judgments. The Court held:
The rationale for deference ... is not limited to the
superiority of the trial judge's position to make
determinations on credibility. . . . [F]actors other
than demeanor and inflection go into the decision
whether or not to believe a witness. Documents or
objective evidence may contradict the witness'
story; or the story itself may be so internally
inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it.7 6
The testimony of even a witness whose demeanor is
smooth, polished, and apparently sincere may be found
not credible if his story is contradicted by the objective
facts and by the relevant documents. The Tax Court's
determinations of fraud against Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle

72
E.g., Switzer v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 759, 765 (1953).
73For argument along these lines, see, e.g., Taxpayers' Brief
on the Merits on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ballard v.
Commissioner, No. 03-184, at 40-41.

74

470 U.S. 564 (1985).
Id., at 574.
76
Id., at 574-575.
75
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d
rested overwhelmingly on the objective facts
documents, not on "trust me; I was there" assess: the
demeanor.
nts of
The Tax Court's fraud determinations rest d
broadly similar rationales for each of the three t e on
ers. 77 They included:
axpay(1) Training and experience of the taxpayers. Th
. d
.
ose
h ave 1ong b een recogruze
as pertinent to the fra d
inquiry. 7 BBallard and Lisle were both sophisticatud
and experienced businessmen. The former had he~d
high executive positions at Prudential and Goldman Sachs; the latter had held high executiv
positions at Prudential and Travelers. Kanter ha~
been a practicing tax attorney for over 30 years. He
had taught tax courses at the University of Chicago
Law Schoo.l, had written and published extensively
on tax topics, and was a nationally prominent tax
expert.

(2) Consistent and substantial understatements of
income. Those conditions are strong evidence of
fraud.7 9 Each of the taxpayers had unreported
income for over a decade, totaling several million
dollars for each.
(3) Engaging in complex series of arrangements to
conceal the true nature of the income and the
identities of those who earned or received it. The
taxpayers' arrangements included commingling
funds, using sham entities, creating elaborate
money flows, and putting money or property in the
names of nominees. Those devices are indicative of
fraud.BO

(4) Impeding the IRS's investigation. In varying
degrees, the taxpayers withheld relevant documents, destroyed records, tried to put records beyond the reach of the IRS, and made false and
misleading statements to IRS agents. Those actions
are evidence of fraud.BI

The Tax Court's opinion mentioned witness credibility
only rarely. For instance, it stated: "Kanter' s testimony at
trial was implausible, unreliable, and sometimes contradictory. We did not find it credible."B2 Again, referring to
three witnesses (not Ballard, Kanter, and Lisle), the court
said: "The testimony of [the witnesses] is not credible.
They performed no services for [one of the sham entities].
The payments to them were from funds Ballard and Lisle
earned from the Prudential transactions." 83
Those occasional credibility assessments do not undermine my argument. The credibility assessments do not
appear to depend on demeanor. Their phrasing sugges'.s
that the court disbelieved the witnesses because their

77The summary in the text is drawn from 1999 TNT 241-4
paras. 602-643.
7 BE.g., Iletj v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 631, 635 (1952).
79 E.g., Marcus v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 562, 577 (1978), aff d
without published opinion 621 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1980). .
)
B0 E.g., United States v. Peterson, 338 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1964 ·
BI E.g., Estate of Beck v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 297 (1971).
2
B 1999 TNT 241-4 para. 639.
83
Id. para. 590.
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sertions contradicted the established facts and docu·5ents, not because of the witnesses' verbal inflections or
onverbal signals. One does not have to hear the wit~esses '~live" to ~onclude that th~ir testimon)'." "wa~
iJnplaus1ble, unreliable, and sometimes contradictory.
'[hose conclusions can easily emerge from comparing the
transcribed testimony to the facts established by the
: documents, by stipulation, or otherwise.
·····: Th!~e additional points. First, I realize that I am
attacking a cow sacred to some. Many judges and commentators have remarked on the trial magistrate's opportunity to observe the witnesses; some have almost rhapsodized about it. 84 I must confess that I have long
suspected that the benefit of that opportunity has been
exaggerated.
In my own life, subsequent events have made it
painfully clear that I often have believed smooth liars and
disbelieved bumbling truth-tellers. I hope that our trial
judges have a higher batting average than mine, but I'm
not entirely sure they do. A recent report by a psychology
professor presented at an American Medical Association
conference, although it studied laypersons rather than
judges, fortifies my concern. The report found that the
"vast majority" of people fail to detect the "flickers of
falsehood" of liars. Of 13,000 people tested, "we found
31, who we call wizards, who are usually able to tell
whether the person is lying."85
Second, the Supreme Court remarked in the Morgan
case that "the one who decides must hear."86 But sweeping statements typically require refinement, certainly in
an area like due process. Morgan involved a Fair Labor
Standards Act determination, and the Court did not
require that the secretary of labor (who had ultimate
responsibility for making the determination) actually
preside at the hearing. Recognizing that, subsequent
courts have held that the broad Morgan language "is used
in the artistic sense of requiring certain procedural
minima to insure an informed judgment by the one who
has [final decisional] responsibility."87 Those minima
were satisfied in our cases because the judge had available to him the voluminous transcript, stipulations, and
documentary exhibits as well as the STJ' s findings and
recommendations.
Third, analogous lines of cases support the constitutionality of Rule 183. There are times when the decision
for the Tax Court is rendered by a judge other than the
judge who presided over the hearing. That happens

84s
ee, e.g., Queen v. Bertrand, 4 Moo. P.C.N.S. 460, 481, 16 Eng.
Re]J. 391, 399 (1867).
85 Prof. Maureen O'Sullivan, quoted in "Truth 'Wizards' Foil
Liars," Las Vegas Review-Journal, Oct. 15, 2004, p. 7A (Associated
Press report). The emphasis on "usually" is mine, to note that
even those few, exceptional people sometimes fail in their
demeanor evaluations.
86
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).
87
Southern Garment Mfrs. Ass'n Inc. v. Fleming, 122 F.2d 622,
626 (D.C. Cir. 1941); see also Estate of Varian v. Commissioner, 396
F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1968)(the Morgan language "means simply
that the officer who makes the findings must have considered
the evidence or arguments").

when the presiding judge resigned, 88 retired,89 or died90
after the hearing but before decision. It also happens by
statute. When the presiding judge submits her report, the
chief judge is empowered to direct that the case be
reviewed by the full court. When that happens, section
7460(b) prescribes that the presiding judge's repqrt "shall
not be a part of the record in [the] case."91
Disappointed taxpayers have raised due process challenges to the decisions in many such cases. Those challenges have uniformly been rejected by the courts, including in fraud cases92 and often in strong language.93
The cited cases establish that it is not error for a nonpresiding judge to render a decision for the court; the
presiding judge's view (if contrary to the deciding
judge's view) need not receive "clearly erroneous" deference; and the presiding judge's report need not be
included in the record.
One might rejoin that, in section 7460(b) cases, the
presiding judge has the chance to write a dissenting
opinion, so the appellate court may become aware of that
judge's view of the case. However, that opportunity does
not exist in the resignation, retirement, and death cases, a
fact that does not alter the result.
In summary, demeanor is only a part of the larger
issue of credibility. As the Supreme Court taught in
Anderson, a trial court's factual findings can rest on
objective factors independent of witness demeanor and
those findings are entitled to deference on appeal even if
based on those factors rather than on demeanor. That
describes Kanter, Ballard, and related cases. The Tax
Court's findings of fraud were not demeanor-dependent.
The objective facts were discernable by the judge from
the record, and they were reviewable by the circuit courts
from the record.
3. Burdens from additional procedures. For the preceding reasons, the benefits from altering Rule 183 would be
small, either by commanding additional deference by the.
judge to the STJ' s conclusions or by adding the STJ' s
original report to the appellate record. There would,
though, be costs. Depending on which change were
made, there might be a decrease of the Tax Court's
efficiency in case disposition. 94 Moreover, according the
original STJ' s report greater prominence in the trial or

88E.g., Towers v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 233, 234 (2d Cir. 1957),
cert. denied 355 U.S. 914 (1958).
89
E.g., Seaside Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 990
(2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied 308 U.S. 618 (1939).
90
E.g., Amoroso v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 583, 586 (1st Cir.
1952), cert. denied 343 U.S. 926 (1952).
91
See, e.g., Estate of Varian v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 753,
754-755 (9th Cir. 1968); Heim v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 44, 47-48
(8th Cir. 1958); Powell v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 483, 486 (1st Cir.
1938).
92
E.g., Halle v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 500, 503-504 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 949 (1950).
93
E.g., Towers, supra note 88, 247 F.2d at 234 ("the contention
that the petitioners were deprived of procedural due process is
utterly without merit").
94
See Allen D. Madison, "Revisiting Access to the Tax Court's
Deliberative Process," Tax Notes, May 10, 2004, p. 749 at 751
("because of the large volume of cases heard using the Rule 183
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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appellate process could undercut the affirmative values
developed in Parts II and III above. Under sections
7443A, 7459, and 7460, the decision through which the
Tax Court speaks is the decision of the judge, not of the
STJ. In addition, formalizing or freezing the STJ's report
in its original form could inhibit intellectual give-andtake between the STJ and the judge, to the detriment of
the court's internal deliberative process.

C. Effective Appellate Review
As noted in Part LB., all nine circuit court judges
rejected the due process arguments discussed thus far.
Judge Cudahy dissented because of a different due
process concern: That the absence of the STJ's original
report from the record precluded effective judicial review. However, that concern too is misplaced.
At the outset, it is important to understand what the
appellate court reviews. What is reviewed is the decision
of the Tax Court,95 and that decision is rendered by the
judge, not by the STJ. Congress said that in sections
7443A and 7460, and the Supreme Court confirmed it in
Freytag. 96 Therefore, the question is not "did the Tax
Court's opinion adequately account for the STJ's findings
and recommendations?" Instead, the question is "does
the Tax Court's opinion, standing on its own, adequately
justify the holding(s) the Tax Court reached?"
In those terms, the Tax Court's opinion was reviewable, effectively reviewable, even as to the fraud determinations. As pointed out in Part N.B.2., those determinations rested on objective facts developed from an
abundant trial record. The circuit courts had that record
and were fully able to assess whether the Tax Court's
factual findings were supported by the record and
whether, as a matter of law, those findings formed a
sufficient basis for imposition of fraud penalties. That
assessment did not have to juggle ambiguities regarding
demeanor because demeanor played a minor role at best
in the Tax Court's decision.
An appellate court that found either that the Tax
Court's findings were unsupported by the record or that
the properly found facts did not establish fraud under the
law, had the opportunity, indeed the duty, to reverse. It is
noteworthy that one of the circuit courts did that in part:
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in Lisle as to the deficiencies
but reversed regarding the fraud penalties.97

code sec~ons go:rerning the . Tax Court.9B Those arguments failed to fmd favor with any of the nine circuit
court judges. The Rule 183 argument is very much an
uphill fight given the settled principle that a court's
interpretation of its own rules is accorded "a great deal of
deference."9 9 The statutory arguments depend, in the
main, on misconstruing "decision," "report," and other
terms in the sections.100
Moreover, arguments for heightened deference to STJ
findings exist in uneasy relation to the direction of
sections 7443A(c) and 7460(b) that the decision of the Tax
Court is rendered by the judge, not the STJ. For instance
assume that "clearly erroneous" deference were accorded
to the STJ findings and that, in a particular case, the judge
assigned to decide the case had a 51 percent conviction
that the STJ's view was wrong. On a de nova standard, the
judge would reject the STJ's findings. On a "clearly
erroneous" standard, though, the judge would have to
accept those findings. Because of deference, the STJ's
view would prevail. In effect, the STJ would be rendering
the decision on behalf of the court despite the statutes'
direction that the judge render that decision.
I want to address in greater detail two arguments:
those involving section 7482 and the policy of transparency. Those have been advanced by Leandra Lederman101
as well as others. Prof. Lederman's is an important voice
in tax procedure, and her views deserve respectful consideration.
A. Section 7482
Section 7482(a) was enacted in 1948. It provides in
relevant part that the circuit courts "shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tax Court ... in
the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of
the district court in civil actions tried without a jury."
Prof. Lederman argues: "The Tax Court's current practice
of keeping the reports of [STJs] in Rule 183 cases out of
the record on appeal violates this statute because it
renders the [circuit courts] incapable of reviewing Tax
Court decisions 'to the same extent' as bench trials in the
district courts. " 102
But statutes must be interpreted in light of their
purposes,103 and section 7482(a) is no exception. Because
of the persons appointed to it and its specialized docket,
the Tax Court possesses greater tax expertise than any
other federal court. Accordingly, the idea sometimes has
been voiced that Tax Court decisions should receive

V. Statutory Arguments
As our cases worked their way through the judicial
process, taxpayers and others argued that the Tax Court's
application of Rule 183 is inconsistent with the rule itself,
with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, or with

process, imposing on the Tax Court an extra review process
could have a serious effect on the caseload of the Tax Court").
95
See section 7482(a)(the circuit courts have "jurisdiction to
review the decision of the Tax Court").
96
Freijtag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 875 n.3 (1991)(An STJ
"has no authority to decide a case" in the category to which our
cases belong).
97
See Lisle, supra note 4, 341 F.3d at 375-383.
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98
See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae National Federation of
Independent Business Legal Foundation, Ballard v. Commissioner
and Kanter v. Commissioner, Nos. 03-184 and 03-1034, at 19-20
(ar~ents under sections 7459 and 7461).
9
Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 878 (Cudahy, J., concurring
in ~art and dissenting in part).
00
see, e.g., id. at 842-43.
.
101
Brief of Amicus Curiae Prof. Leandra Lederman, Ballard v.
Commissioner and Kanter v. Commissioner, Nos. 03-184 and 031034 (hereafter Lederman Brief); Leandra Lederman, "Transparency and Obfuscation in Tax Court Procedure," Tax Notes, Mar.
22, 2004, p. 1539 (hereafter Lederman Article).
102Lederman Brief, supra note 101, at 1-2.
103
E.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586
(1983).
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greater deference than those of other tax trial tribunals.
The high-water mark of that was the Supreme Court's
1943 Dobson decision.104
That aspect of Dobson provoked strong opposition. It is
clear that a main purpose of the 1948 legislation was to
overturn that aspect of Dobson. 105 Prof. Lederman
agrees. 106 Uncertainty clouds much else about the 1948
legislation and Congress's intentions as to it, as is shown
by the painstaking work of Prof. David Shores, who has
offered the most comprehensive history of the 1948
legislation. 107 Nonetheless, the anti-Dobson purpose was
clear.
In this respect, section 7482(a) was a command directed to the appellate courts, a command to cease
extraordinary deference to the Tax Court. It was not a
command to the Tax Court to structure its internal
processes (as to S1Js or anything else) along any particular lines. The circuit courts were told how to deal with
decisions reaching them from the Tax Court. The Tax
Court was not told by what processes it is to reach its
decisions.
Section 7482(a) should be given effect in terms of its
purpose as to the appellate courts. It should not be
converted into a device to change a trial court. My
argument draws strength from three Supreme Court
administrative law decisions in the last decade. In
MCI, 108 Brown & Williamson, 109 and ATA, 110 the Court
rejected attempts by agencies to change established jurisdiction or rules based on thin statutory language unsupported by demonstrated congressional intent. "Each of
these cases stands for the proposition that Congress does
not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme
in vague or ancillary provisions." 111 Similarly, statutory
language directed at appellate courts should not be the
basis for backdoor change of a trial court.

B. Transparency
Many critics of the decisions in our cases complain
that Rule 183 is applied in a secretive manner inconsistent with what they perceive to be a general policy of

(
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104
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 498-507 (1943).
105For some of the history, see Steve R. Johnson, "The
Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why Heightened
Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions Is Undesirable," 77
Or. L. Rev. 235, 247-253 (1998).
106Lederman Brief, supra note 101, at 9 (section 7482(a)(l)
"was enacted in 1948 to overturn the holding in Dabs.on").
107
See David F. Shores, "Deferential Review of Tax Court
Decisions: Dobson Revisited," 49 Tax Law. 629 (1996).
108MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (rejecting a Federal Communications Commission attempt to modify tariff filing by longdistance carriers).
109
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120
(2000)(rejecting a Federal Drug Administration attempt to regulate tobacco as a drug).
110
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns Inc., 531 U.S. 457
(2001) (rejecting an Environmental Protection Agency attempt to
modify national air quality standards because of implementation costs).
111
New York State Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 276 F. Supp.2d 110, 127
(D.D.C. 2003).
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transparency in court and administrative processes. 112
Judge Cudahy put it this way: "Transparency is the
universal practice of agencies and courts employing
these decisional practices. The question then becomes, if
there are policy reasons that dictate transparency for
everyone else, why do these reasons not apply to the Tax
Court?" 113
One is tempted to respond to the question by invoking
aspects of the affirmative case described earlier, but there
are anterior responses to the transparency argument.
First, the question posed by Judge Cudahy is a question
for Congress, not for the courts. It would be illegitimate
for a court to say, "We can discern no reason why the Tax
Court should be different. Therefore, we will order the
Tax Court to conform its procedures to the procedures of
other courts and of agencies." That would be judicial
legislation. The Tax Court is an Article I court, thus a
creature of Congress. Transparency is a policy argument.
Congress can change Tax Court procedures based on a
policy argument. The courts should not. If, contrary to
my view, the Supreme Court concludes that Rule 183's
application violates the Constitution or present statutes,
the Court can and should invalidate that rule. But the
Court should not take that action based on a policy
argument alone.
Second, viewed through a wider lens, transparency is
hardly a universal principle of our courts. Among other
examples, initial drafts of Supreme Court and other
courts' opinions are not published or disclosed; law
clerks' memoranda to their judges and notes between
judges are privileged; predecisional communications
among officials of agencies are often shielded by the
governmental deliberative privilege; 114 and as previously
noted, section 7460(b) provides that an initial report by
the assigned judge is omitted from the record on appeal
in cases subject to full-court review. In short, while love
may conquer all, transparency does not, at least not in
our judicial process.
Transparency has great "sound bite" appeal. Opposing that rhetoric is like impugning motherhood, apple
pie, and the flag. But slogans should not displace sober
analysis of institutional roles and structures, and policies
are subject to constraints. 115
C. Possible Legislative Change

Prof. Lederman discusses the possibility of Congress
enacting legislation to alter Rule 183, and she identifies a
candidate vehicle for legislation. 116 Efforts along those
lines are being attempted although it is too early to assess
the prospects for their success.

112E.g., Lederman Brief, supra note 101, at 22-26; Lederman
Article, supra note 101, at 1542-1544.
113
Kanter, supra note 4, 337 F.3d at 874 (Cudahy, J., concurring
in ~art and dissenting in part).
14
E.g., United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792,
798-799 (1984).
115Cf Frank Easterbrook, "Statutes' Domains," 50 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 533, 541 (1983)("No matter how good the end in view,
achievement of that end will have some cost, and at some point
the cost will begin to exceed the benefits.").
116Lederman Article, supra note 101, at 1543-1544.

1245

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

For reasons explained above, I would far prefer Congress to the Supreme Court as the agent of change of Rule
183 if there is to be change. Indeed, I would welcome
(although not necessarily support) a serious legislative
effort on those lines. As noted in Part I.A., the Tax Court
did not explain the reasons for its rule change in 1983.
One could venture a guess based on timing,117 but
speculation is a poor substih~te f?r explanati~n.
Hearings on proposed legislation would give the Tax
Court renewed opportunity to explain why the 1983
change was made and to present its view as to the. ~urr~nt
importance or lack thereof of Ru.le 183. That. clarifica'.ion
would be constructive. Based on it and other information,
Congress could then balance the rule's benefit(s) against
transparency and other values. The super~ority of those
hearings and explanation over the less flexible process of

117
The year 1983 was within the period that saw substantial
litigation as to the "first era" of tax shelters (as opposed to the
current wave of shelters), and the Tax Court used STJs in many
shelter cases. The 1983 change may have been made. for efficiency, to move shelter and other cases more expeditiously.

litigation is a further reason why change, if any is
desirable, should be effected by Congress, not by the
Supreme Court.

VI. Conclusion
At its most basic level, Kanter I Ballard is about whethe
we will take the chief judge, the judge, and the STJ a~
their word when they say that the court's opinion adopts
the STJ's opinion. If we do, the principal objections to the
decisions melt. I firmly believe we should take those
officials at their word. Ours is an age of suspicion, and
"trust no one" is a standard to which the c;:rucal readily
repair. But that approach does not provide a sound
foundation for judicial administration over the long run.
In any event, the balance of the argument supports the
decision of the Tax Court confirmed by decisions of the
Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. Affirmative values
as to how courts speak and the nature of their deliberative processes support these decisions, and the constitutional and statutory arguments against them have significant shortcomings. If (a big "if") Rule 183 should be
changed, Congress, not the Supreme Court, should be the
author of the change.
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